Fine-grained cryptographic primitives are secure against adversaries with bounded resources and can be computed by honest users with less resources than the adversaries. In this paper, we revisit the results by Degwekar, Vaikuntanathan, and Vasudevan in Crypto 2016 on fine-grained cryptography and show the constructions of three key fundamental fine-grained cryptographic primitives: one-way permutations, hash proof systems (which in turn implies a public-key encryption scheme against chosen chiphertext attacks), and trapdoor one-way functions. All of our constructions are computable in and secure against (non-uniform) circuits under the widely believed worst-case assumption.
CITATION STYLE
Egashira, S., Wang, Y., & Tanaka, K. (2019). Fine-Grained Cryptography Revisited. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 11923 LNCS, pp. 637–666). Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34618-8_22
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