This paper discusses Fiscal Illusion as a special case of Agents and Multiagents Systems. Under fiscal illusion, each taxpayer does not realize how much he/she really pays to the State; therefore, he/she does not evaluate well the public actions. We will study this issue as a particular case of a 'Dictator game' with relevant applications not only for Public Finances but also for specific domains like Pervasive agents and Ambient Intelligence, or for User-centered applications and Assisting Agents. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.
CITATION STYLE
Mourão, P. (2012). A case of dictator game in public finances-fiscal illusion between agents. In Advances in Intelligent and Soft Computing (Vol. 151 AISC, pp. 249–254). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28765-7_29
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.