In this paper we introduce a new framework for controlling compliance to discretionary access control policies [Cederquist et al. in Proceedings of the International Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks (POLICY), 2005; Corin et al. in Proceedings of the IFIP Workshop on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust (FAST), 2004]. The framework consists of a simple policy language, modeling ownership of data and administrative policies. Users can create documents, and authorize others to process the documents. To control compliance to the document policies, we define a formal audit procedure by which users may be audited and asked to justify that an action was in compliance with a policy. In this paper we focus on the implementation of our framework. We present a formal proof system, which was only informally described in earlier work. We derive an important tractability result (a cut-elimination theorem), and we use this result to implement a proof-finder, a key component in this framework. We argue that in a number of settings, such as collaborative work environments, where a small group of users create and manage document in a decentralized way, our framework is a more flexible approach for controlling the compliance to policies. © Springer-Verlag 2007.
CITATION STYLE
Cederquist, J. G., Corin, R., Dekker, M. A. C., Etalle, S., den Hartog, J. I., & Lenzini, G. (2007). Audit-based compliance control. In International Journal of Information Security (Vol. 6, pp. 133–151). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-007-0017-y
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