For an electronic election to be fully democratic there is a need for security mechanisms that will assure the privacy of the voters. With receipt-free electronic voting, a voter neither obtains nor is able to construct a receipt proving the content of her vote. In this paper we first consider the minimal requirements for receipt-free elections, without untappable communication channels between the voter and the voting authorities. We then propose a solution, which satisfies these requirements. This solution is based on an encryption blackbox, which uses its own randomness. Finally we present an implementation with smartcards, suitable for Internet voting. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
CITATION STYLE
Magkos, E., Burmester, M., & Chrissikopoulos, V. (2001). Receipt-freeness in large-scale elections without untappable channels. In IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology (Vol. 74, pp. 683–694). Springer New York LLC. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-47009-8_50
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