Receipt-freeness in large-scale elections without untappable channels

60Citations
Citations of this article
29Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.

This article is free to access.

Abstract

For an electronic election to be fully democratic there is a need for security mechanisms that will assure the privacy of the voters. With receipt-free electronic voting, a voter neither obtains nor is able to construct a receipt proving the content of her vote. In this paper we first consider the minimal requirements for receipt-free elections, without untappable communication channels between the voter and the voting authorities. We then propose a solution, which satisfies these requirements. This solution is based on an encryption blackbox, which uses its own randomness. Finally we present an implementation with smartcards, suitable for Internet voting. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Magkos, E., Burmester, M., & Chrissikopoulos, V. (2001). Receipt-freeness in large-scale elections without untappable channels. In IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology (Vol. 74, pp. 683–694). Springer New York LLC. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-47009-8_50

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free