Citizen Participation and Decentralization in the Philippines

Abstract

Since the early 1990s, democratization and decentralization have radically changed the functioning of both national and local governments in the Philip-pines. The Local Government Code of 1992, for instance, reassigned functions and powers that were previously under national agencies to local government units (lgus). Furthermore, the 1992 Urban and Housing Development Act transferred housing, social services and land use functions to local govern-ments, in attempts to curb the growth of informal settlements and poverty. In addition to this, constitutional and legal reforms have led to a national 'citizen charter' which has enabled citizens and citizen groups to complain to officials whenever the delivery of public services is inadequate. Therefore, the 1989 Constitution gave civil society a more prominent role in policy development. As a result of these changes, some observers argue that citizens have become more actively engaged with the performance of (local) governments (see, for example, Guevarra 2004; Holmes 2011; Porio 2012, 2014). However, while most studies have hailed this increased citizen participation as a boost for the per-formance of local governments, some have argued that decentralization has also led to the further entrenchment of traditional elites and their local allies (Rocamora 2003). After twenty years of local governance reforms, and with increased citizen participation through ngos, community-based organiza-tions (cbos) and people's organizations (pos), many civil society leaders and reform advocates in the Philippines find themselves questioning the preva-lence of such predatory and clientelistic practices of the political elites. Previous studies have argued that the weak institutional apparatus of the Philippine state is responsible for this entrenchment of elite politics (e.g. Rocamora 2003) and further reinforced by the absence of strong political par-ties (Rivera 2011). These institutional arguments can partly account for the dominance of political-economic elites in local politics. Yet I expand this argu-ment further and state that the mobilization and participation of civil society groups is actually helping local elites to strengthen their dominance. I stress that the new emphasis on citizen participation and accountability has not led to the redistribution of power; on the contrary, the emphasis on civil society participation has actually offered new avenues for 'dynastic' local families to Porio 32 develop and nurture local support, further cementing their powerful positions. Unlike earlier political elites, the current breed of politicians have engaged var-ious segments of civil society and the private sector in their implementation of government programmes. In this process, mayors and government officials construct a seemingly accountable, participatory and empowered governance structure by forging collaborative partnerships with civil society organizations and the private sector, while in fact they are reinforcing their political domi-nance as, in actuality, these partnerships can weaken civil society. This is done through what I call 'networked governance practices' – the prac-tice of incorporating civil society organizations by giving them a role in city governance (and thus access to budgets of local government units (lgus)) in exchange for political support during elections. Unlike the earlier centralized period, the above-mentioned governance reforms open up spaces for local chief executives to create legitimate networks and alliances with civil society organizations and the private sector, so that they engage in implementing their priority programmes. Through these mechanisms, the power of the local chief executive (including that of his family and allied social, political and economic networks) is socially produced and reinforced in governance structures and practices. Democratization and Decentralization