Reflections on the Sicilian Mafia: Peripheries and Their Impact on Centres

Abstract

The term " mafia " comes originally from Sicily, where it refers to the private use of violence in public domains. Its etymology is controversial (Novacco, 1959). Whatever its feudal and patrimonial dispositions, mafia is a modern phenomenon: it developed in the slipstream of Italian unification when a modern state structure imposed itself on a predominantly agrarian society still largely feudal in its basic features. In the absence of effective central control over the means of violence, mafia took shape as an instrumentum regni of Italian politicians, who chose to rule Sicily through its dominant class of absentee landlords most of whom were residing in Palermo, long the centre of wealth and power of the island. (Incidentally, this may help explain why eastern Sicily always had a much lower density of mafia than the four western provinces, which formed the hinterland of the island's capital.) Mafia presence was particularly strong in and around Palermo, in the adjacent citrus fruit area of the Conca d'Oro (Golden Shell) and its vast forbidding hinterland that covered the island's western interior, aptly characterized by Fentress (2000: 132) as a " bandit corridor " because of the prevailing cattle theft " industry, " organized through a vast network of accomplices that extended from the western part of Palermo province through Caltanissetta province and into Agrigento province (Fentress, 2000: 132). This was the area of large cereal-pasture holdings (the so-called latifundia or ex-feudi), the history of which goes back to early antiquity. Until the 1960s, absentee landowners entrusted its management to ruthless local upwardly mobile leaseholders and overseers who had a reputation for violence and therefore enjoyed " respect. " These local bosses and their retainers formed the backbone of the rural mafia, which consisted of loosely formed coalitions, called cosche or " families. " Each family or cosca controlled its own territory – a village, a town, or an urban neighbourhood – and enforced a tribute on all economic transitions under its " protection. " The typical mafioso was a middleman or power broker, who thrived on the gaps in communication between landlord and peasant, seller and buyer of commodities and services, political candidate and electorate. Ultimately, mafiosi held sway over the links between state and community, backing up their protection and mediation by violence. D. Siegel and H. Nelen (eds.), Organized Crime: Culture, Markets and Policies. 7 © Springer 2008 8 A. Blok Profile Mafiosi controlled local resources, like property, markets, services, and votes. They operated in collusion with members of the elite, most notably urban-based landlords, politicians, government officials, and businessmen. This " contiguity " involved mutual protection and the exchange of " favours. " But the protection which mafiosi offered was sometimes difficult to distinguish from extortion and the boundaries between victim and accomplice were often likewise blurred. In the no mans land between public and private domains, mafiosi were left a free hand in the management of local affairs. Although they exacerbated class tensions between landlords and peasants by their rent-capitalist management of the estates and appropriating land and becoming landowners in their own right, they also con-trolled these tensions by carving out channels of upward mobility for ambitious and ruthless peasant and shepherds. In Sicily, as probably elsewhere under similar conditions (Brogan, 1998; Tilly, 1997, 2000; Varese, 2001), mafia and politics provided " carrières ouvertes aux talents " [careers open to those with talents] (Fentress, 2000: 149). Towards the large mass of landless peasants and shepherds, from whose ranks they usually originated, their attitude involved undisguised disdain and exploitation. When indicted for violent crimes, mafiosi were usually acquitted for lack of evidence because of high-level protection and because local witnesses would rarely openly turn against them. This greatly helped to enhance their power and their reputation as " men of respect. " Inspired by both fear and admiration, the local population drew up a " wall of silence " (omertà), which ultimately blocked effective prosecution of mafiosi. Until recently, the power of mafiosi, although surrounded and buttressed by silence, was openly displayed. It illustrated the peaceful coexistence between mafia and state. Far from being " a state within a state, " as magistrates and journalists often represented the phenomenon, mafiosi successfully infiltrated public institutions, including political parties, local governments, the judiciary, banks, and legal firms. They did so through their own personal network of " friends " rather than as members of corporate groups or of a unified and centralized organization. With the extension of the suffrage, they enlarged their grip on the electorate and controlled more votes. With the extension of postwar government aid to " develop " the country's southern peripheries, mafiosi swallowed up ever more funds, most notably in the urban construction industry, always capable of placing themselves with cunning and force between state and citizen (cf. Jamieson, 2000: 20–21). Sicilian mafia appears as the violent alternative to civil society. This was the price the Italian State eventually had to pay for the pragmatic accommodation, which later became know as " pollution " of public institutions. It was the other side of a peaceful coexistence. It also provides an example of the great impact a periphery can have on the centre. Long played down, dismissed, or wilfully misunderstood as a construction – as an invention of people who do not like Sicily – mafia was only recently recognized as one of Italy's main social problems. Yet this reference to the " the Southern Problem " (or " Question ") still ignores and obscures the extent to which the Italian state itself has been transformed in its interaction with its southern periphery.