Legitimacy Building in Policy and Practice: The Case of US Private Military and Security Contractors (PMSCs) in Afghanistan

Abstract

From 2000 to 2009, the USUnited StatesCountriesmilitary more than tripled its contracts with private military and security contractors (PMSCs). During the same period, a focus on building legitimacylegitimacy for domesticdomestic governments became central to USUSCountries counterinsurgencycounterinsurgency doctrine. This chapter examines how these corresponding changes in policy and practice interact. Prior research on legitimacy in contentious politics has shown that the involvement of external actors working on behalf of a nationalnational government can introduce ambiguities that undermine the legitimacy of counterinsurgency operations. We extend this research by specifically examining how the use of PMSCs affected this dynamic during counterinsurgency operations that followed the 2001 USUSCountries invasion of AfghanistanAfghanistanCountries. To do this, we analyze reports published under the United NationsUnited Nations Human Rights CouncilHuman Rights Council. We find that the widespread use of PMSCs undermined local perceptions that the AfghanAfghan Government was capable of establishing security and stability, both of which are considered central components of legitimacy building during counterinsurgency. Moreover, we detail how legallegal and institutionalinstitutional ambiguities limited the USUSCountries Government's capacity to mediate the adverse effects that PMSCs had on the legitimacy of counterinsurgency operations. Our findings suggest that the use of PMSCs can actually exacerbate previously identified challenges associated with legitimacy building during counterinsurgency."