Euthanasia, Assisted-Suicide, and Palliative Sedation: A Brief Clarification and Reinforcement of the Moral Logic

Abstract

A persistent misunderstanding of the moral distinctions between the practices of euthanasia, assisted suicide, and palliative sedation suggests a critical need to revisit the relationship each shares with licit medical practice in the context of palliative care. To that end, this essay grounds its arguments in two, straightforward premises: (i) the licitness of medical practice is largely determined by the balance between (a) good ends, (b) proportionate means, (c) appropriate circumstances, and (d) benevolent intentions; and (ii) whereas palliative sedation employs criteria A-D (above), both euthanasia and assisted suicide fail to secure criteria A-C. Drawing from this syllogism, the aim and proposal of this essay is to examine the logic inherent to the practices of euthanasia, assisted suicide, and palliative sedation in the context of palliative care with the intention of positing the argument that while palliative sedation fulfills the requirements of morally licit medical practice – and so successfully executes the tenets of sound ethical logic – both euthanasia and assisted suicide do not.