The dilemma of conservative justice

Abstract

The topic of this chapter derives from Henry Sidgwick, and is sometimes labeled as the “paradox of conservative justice” [1]. In The Methods of Ethics (1st edition, 1874) Sidgwick asks whether political reforms that have a morally desirable goal could justifiably be rejected simply on the grounds that implementing them would spoil the life plans of those who believe that the future would be like the past. The paradox is that “ideal justice” demands that we carry out reforms but “conservative justice” requires respecting people’s reasonable expectations, although carrying out reforms seems to imply that those expectations would not be respected. The question raises a moral dilemma. The government has an obligation to improve society and correct existing injustices, but surely it has also an obligation not to disappoint people’s natural expectations, partly created by the government itself. When the circumstances are such that correcting injustices results in disappointing people’s reasonable expectations, the government simply cannot comply with both of these obligations. It should be clear that this kind of dilemma concerns not only political reforms, but is familiar for instance from the workplaces that revise their practices in the name of fairness. The dilemma arises from the assumption that the status quo is not just. Often it is not.