Empirical analysis of SSL/TLS weaknesses in real websites: Who cares?

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Abstract

As SSL/TLS has become the de facto standard Internet protocol for secure communication in recent years, its security issues have also been intensively studied. Even though several tools have been introduced to help administrators know which SSL/TLS vulnerabilities exist in their network hosts, it is still unclear whether the best security practices are effectively adopted to fix those vulnerabilities in real-world applications. In this paper, we present the landscape of real websites about SSL/TLS weaknesses through an automatic analysis of the possibilities of six representative SSL/TLS attacks—Heartbleed, POODLE, CCS injection, FREAK, Logjam and DROWN—on popular websites. Surprisingly, our experiments show that 45% and 52.6% of top 500 most popular global and Korean websites are still vulnerable to at least one of those attacks, respectively. We also observed several interesting trends in how websites were vulnerable to those attacks. Our findings suggest that better tools and education programs for SSL/TLS security are needed to help administrators keep their systems up-to-date with security patches.

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APA

Oh, S., Kim, E., & Kim, H. (2017). Empirical analysis of SSL/TLS weaknesses in real websites: Who cares? In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 10144 LNCS, pp. 174–185). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56549-1_15

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