Folk epistemology and the justification of democracy

Abstract

Imagine a society in which the legitimacy of the government is held to rest, at least indirectly, upon the consent of those it governs. Imagine further that action on the part of both the government and the citizenry is constrained by a set of rules speci¬fied in a public constitution. This constitution contains procedural provisions not only for holding elections, dividing authority, checking power, and punishing abuses, but also for its own revision. Additionally, let us say that the constitution specifies a menu of individual rights and liberties. This menu specifies rights to hold and exchange property, to privacy, to equal protection under the law, to due process, and so on. In addition to these, the constitution also identifies rights of conscience. Individuals in our imagined society enjoy freedoms of thought, expression, assem¬bly, petition, and religion, all within the constraint that each is entitled to as exten¬sive a share of such liberties as is consistent with there being an equal share for all. Under conditions secured by such a constitution, it is natural to expect there to emerge a vibrant civil society of varied organizations and groups directed to a diversity of ends. Accordingly, citizens will belong to or participate in a range of voluntary and affective associations, from religious groups, ethnic organizations, and political alliances to social clubs and cliques. One result of this is that a variety of moral doctrines will flourish in the society. We should expect that our imagined citizens will not share a common collection of moral commitments. © 2009 Springer Netherlands.