The Double Foundation of Human Rights in Human Nature

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Abstract

In this paper I want to have a closer look at the connections between human rights, human dignity and human nature. I will hold that there are two aspects of human dignity that are simultaneously two aspects of human nature. One aspect concerns the normative, moral status of persons that is connected with their ability to act morally. The other aspect concerns the empirical status of persons that is connected with their neediness and vulnerability. It is this second aspect that leads us to determine the substances of human rights. There are some goods that are indispensible for a decent life. These goods should be protected by human rights. But the second aspect is connected to the first: The recognition of all other human beings as equal moral persons (of their equal moral status, of their dignity) is the foundation of the recognition of their human rights. I will develop the idea that human rights are founded in two aspects of human dignity by using the example of extreme poverty as a violation of human dignity and as a violation of human rights.

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APA

Mieth, C. (2014). The Double Foundation of Human Rights in Human Nature. In Ius Gentium (Vol. 35, pp. 11–22). Springer Science and Business Media B.V. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-8672-0_2

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