Abstract
The paper examines a multi-stage game-theoretic model of an auction where the participants (players) set minimum threshold price levels above which they are ready to sell. Price offerings are a sequence of independent and identically distributed random variables. A two-person game in which each player is interested in selling at a price higher than the competitor’s is considered. Optimal threshold pricing strategies and expected payoffs of the players are determined. Numerical modeling results are presented.
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CITATION STYLE
Mazalov, V., & Ivashko, A. (2020). Online Auction and Optimal Stopping Game with Imperfect Observation. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 12033 LNAI, pp. 145–156). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41964-6_13
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