Toward genuine continuity of life and mind

Abstract

The strong continuity thesis was introduced into the artificial life literature in 1994, [5], but since then has not received the attention and further development it merits. In this paper, I explain why if we are to identify genuine continuity between life and mind, a shift in perspective is needed from thinking about living and minded things and processes, to thinking about Life itself and Mind itself. I describe both life and mind as self-preserving processes and argue that this notion accounts for their purported continuity, drawing on research in embedded and embodied cognition to make my case. I then respond to Peter Godfrey-Smith's observation that any view on which thought requires language is inconsistent with the strong continuity thesis by arguing that although such a view of thought might be rendered consistent with the thesis, a dynamic systems approach to cognition, i.e., one wherein thought is language-independent, is much more conducive to identifying genuine life-mind continuity. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005.