Standing and Pre-trial Misconduct: Hypocrisy, ‘Separation’, Inconsistent Blame, and Frustration

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Abstract

Existing justifications for exclusionary rules and stays of proceedings in response to pre-trial wrongdoing by police officers and prosecutors are often thought to be counter-productive or disproportionate in their consequences. This article begins to explore whether the concept of standing to blame can provide a fresh justification for such responses. It focuses on a vice related to standing—hypocrisy—and a related vice concerning inconsistent blame. It takes seriously the point that criminal justice agencies, although all part of the State, are in real terms separated from each other, and analyses the so-called separation thesis (or theses). It concludes that hypocrisy and inconsistent blame arguments could plausibly justify exclusion and stays only in relation to lower-level offending, and even there only indirectly. This is in the sense that exclusion and stays are expressions of judicial frustration with other bodies for their failure to take pre-trial wrongdoing seriously.

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APA

Stark, F. (2024). Standing and Pre-trial Misconduct: Hypocrisy, ‘Separation’, Inconsistent Blame, and Frustration. Criminal Law and Philosophy, 18(2), 327–349. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-023-09688-2

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