Information Seeking as an Evolutionary Game

Abstract

In this paper we present a game-theoretical model of rumour propagation on social networks. Agents face a choice between making investments at some cost to establish the truth about some underlying fact or copy the views of their network neighbours at no cost. Agents are also assumed to derive a benefit from knowledge about the truth. Considering rumour propagation at a fast time-scale and strategy adaptation at a slower time-scale, we present analysis of outcomes of the resulting evolutionary game. Depending on network structure and cost-benefit ratios, transitions between one and two-cluster solutions, either marked by the existence of only one type of strategy or coexistence of two strategies with low and high investments are found. We establish that clustering in the social network typically suppress the two-cluster solution, thus inhibiting the spread of high-investment strategies and leading to lower population-level awareness of the truth. Moreover, we also investigate the influence of free provision of additional high-quality information by stubborn agents. Counter-intuitively, we find that the presence of such agents encourages free riding – an effect that over-compensates the increased presence of higher quality information and has overall detrimental effects on the population.