Logistics outsourcing of fresh enterprises considering fresh-keeping efforts based on evolutionary game analysis

Abstract

Aiming at the perishable characteristics of fresh products, the high transportation cost, and the positive externalities of enterprises' fresh-keeping efforts, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of logistics outsourcing of fresh enterprises considering fresh-keeping efforts. The evolutionary equilibrium point is calculated and the impact of parameters of the system is analyzed. The results show that the selection of corporate strategy is related to the benefits of the fresh-keeping efforts investment and the amount of income obtained from 'free-rider' behavior. When the investment income of both parties is continually changed, the Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) can be obtained. This paper finds the path to realize the strategy of fresh enterprises and logistics enterprises willing to invest in fresh-keeping efforts. Under the different benefits received by the two parties' investment in logistics resources, the enterprise contract constraints and government policy subsidies are introduced respectively. When the punishment or subsidy is greater than the corresponding critical value, the evolutionary stable strategy of both parties is to invest in fresh-keeping efforts. Numerical simulation is used to verify the theoretical results. The research results have some enlightenment for improving the fresh-keeping level in the logistics outsourcing process of fresh enterprises.