The concrete security bounds for some blockcipher-based constructions sometimes become worrisome or even vacuous; for example, when a light-weight blockcipher is used, when large amounts of data are processed, or when a large number of connections need to be kept secure. Rotating keys helps, but introduces a “hybrid factor” m equal to the number of keys used. In such instances, analysis in the ideal-cipher model (ICM) can give a sharper picture of security, but this heuristic is called into question when cryptanalysis of the real-world blockcipher reveals weak keys, related-key attacks, etc. To address both concerns, we introduce a new analysis model, the ideal-cipher model under key-oblivious access (ICM-KOA). Like the ICM, the ICM-KOA can give sharp security bounds when standardmodel bounds do not. Unlike the ICM, results in the ICM-KOA are less brittle to current and future cryptanalytic results on the blockcipher used to instantiate the ideal cipher. Also, results in the ICM-KOA immediately imply results in the ICM and the standard model, giving multiple viewpoints on a construction with a single effort. The ICMKOA provides a conceptual bridge between ideal ciphers and tweakable blockciphers (TBC): blockcipher-based constructions secure in the ICMKOA have TBC-based analogs that are secure under standard-model TBC security assumptions. Finally, the ICM-KOA provides a natural framework for analyzing blockcipher key-update strategies that use the blockcipher to derive the new key. This is done, for example, in the NIST CTR-DRBG and in the hardware RNG that ships on Intel chips.
CITATION STYLE
Shrimpton, T., & Terashima, R. S. (2016). Salvaging weak security bounds for blockcipher-based constructions. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 10031 LNCS, pp. 429–454). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53887-6_16
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