A better kind of continuity

Abstract

Discussions of what minds are and what they do is a contentious issue. This is particularly so when considering non-human animals, for here the questions become: do they have minds at all? And if so, what kinds of minds are they? Alternatives to Cartesian or computational models of mind open up a whole new space of possibility for how we should conceive of animal minds, while also highlighting how Skinner's pragmatist-inspired radical behaviourism has much more to offer than most researchers in animal cognition would like to admit. Pragmatism, or 'American Naturalism' is also highlighted by Chemero as the alternative for human cognition. The challenge, then, is to build an understanding of mind along pragmatist lines in a way that does justice to both human and non-human animals. A clear understanding of embodiment, and commitment to a radical form of enactivism, can, perhaps, begin to generate a better kind of continuity.