Differential-Linear cryptanalysis of ICEPOLE

Abstract

ICEPOLE is a CAESAR candidate with the intermediate level of robustness under nonce misuse circumstances in the original document. In particular, it was claimed that key recovery attack against ICEPOLE is impossible in the case of nonce misuse. ICEPOLE is strong against the differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis. In this paper, we developed the differential-linear attacks against ICEPOLE when nonce is misused. Our attacks show that the state of ICEPOLE–128 and ICEPOLE– 128a can be recovered with data complexity 246 and time complexity 246; the state of ICEPOLE–256a can be recovered with data complexity 260 and time complexity 260 For ICEPOLE–128a and ICEPOLE–256a, the secret key is recovered once the state is recovered. We experimentally verified the attacks against ICEPOLE–128 and ICEPOLE–128a.