Climate Change and Justice: Perspectives of Legal Theory

0Citations
Citations of this article
4Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.
Get full text

Abstract

A volume on climate law needs normative visions and principles to provide orientation and to line up normative requirements. This may enable to provide a comprehensive view on energy and climate topics. This contribution, while dealing with justice, gives a perspective from ethics respectively from a (re-)interpretation of national constitutions, the EU Charter of fundamental rights and the European convention on human rights in the light of sustainability. It takes us to human rights as the basic norm of any liberal democratic constitution (on national and transnational level), but criticizes the academic international law debate (unlike the practice of international law) which seems to be focused on the idea of even absolute, i.e. not subject to any balancing, environmental fundamental rights. Overall, it turns out that an interpretation of fundamental rights which is more multipolar and considers the conditions for freedom more heavily – as well as the freedom of future generations and of people in other parts of the world – develops a greater commitment to climate protection. Regarding the theory of balancing, for the purpose of a clear balance of powers the usual principle of proportionality also proves specifiable.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Ekardt, F. (2013). Climate Change and Justice: Perspectives of Legal Theory. In Ius Gentium (Vol. 21, pp. 63–79). Springer Science and Business Media B.V. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5440-9_4

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free