The political payoff from performance target systems: No-brainer or no-gainer?

Abstract

Assuming elected politicians have some incentive to adopt public service management systems that will help secure their reelection, this article tests 11 hypotheses about political payoffs to incumbents from ambitious performance target systems. The data come from central performance targets for health and education in Great Britain in the early 2000s and are analyzed through a "consilience" approach that combines analysis of electoral and opinion poll data with analysis of press reports, legislative committee reports, Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development reports, and interviews with senior civil servants. This article uses the weaker target regimes used in Scotland and Wales as against England at that time to explore the difference targets made to credit obtained by incumbent politicians. We find little clear evidence for direct electoral benefits from the tough English targets and also little evidence for symbolic benefits for the incumbent government in support from other actors. These findings prompt questions as to why politicians should have invested significant time and political capital in such a public service management system. © The Author 2010. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Inc. All rights reserved.