We revisit Shin et al.'s leakage-resilient password-based authenticated key establishment protocol (LR-AKEP) and the security model used to prove the security of LR-AKEP. By refining the Leak oracle in the security model, we show that LR-AKE (1) can, in fact, achieve a stronger notion of leakage-resilience than initially claimed and (2) also achieve an additional feature of traceability, not previously mentioned. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007.
CITATION STYLE
Phan, R. C. W., Choo, K. K. R., & Heng, S. H. (2007). Security of a leakage-resilient protocol for key establishment and mutual authentication. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 4784 LNCS, pp. 169–177). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75670-5_11
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