A further note on the stable matching problem

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Abstract

Using a lemma of J.S. Hwang we obtain a generalization of a theorem of Dubins and Freedman. It is shown that the core of the matching game is non-manipulable in a suitable sense by coalitions consisting of both men and women. A further strong stability property of the core is derived. © 1987.

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Demange, G., Gale, D., & Sotomayor, M. (1987). A further note on the stable matching problem. Discrete Applied Mathematics, 16(3), 217–222. https://doi.org/10.1016/0166-218X(87)90059-X

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