We present a sealed-bid electronic auction scheme that is equitably fair for the bidders and the seller. In this scheme, the interests of both the bidders and the seller are safeguarded: the identity of the non-winning bidders and their bidding behavior are protected (anonymity), and the bidders cannot withdraw their bids without being detected (non-repudiation). The scheme fulfills the requirements of a secure auction scheme and is verifiable. It extends the Stubblebine & Syverson auction scheme that is not equitably fair (it does not prevent bid withdrawals). Our scheme employs a Registrar and an Auctioneer for which no special trust assumptions are made.
CITATION STYLE
Magkos, E., Burmester, M., & Chrissikopoulos, V. (2000). An equitably fair on-line auction scheme. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 1875, pp. 72–83). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44463-7_7
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