Social Media, Political Institutions and the Principal–Agent Dilemma

  • Ceron A
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Abstract

Chapter 1 presents the theoretical framework of the book. It starts to discuss the transformation from the Web 1.0 to the Web 2.0 and 3.0, to investigate whether this can produce a revolution or, alternatively, politics will continue as usual. After reviewing the existing literature, this chapter proposes two different frameworks, based on the principal--agent dilemma. One focuses on the idea that social media represent a new additional `principal' for politicians. The other considers them as a tool available to traditional principals. These two frameworks will be tested through the book.

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Ceron, A. (2017). Social Media, Political Institutions and the Principal–Agent Dilemma. In Social Media and Political Accountability (pp. 1–23). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52627-0_1

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