The impacts of subsidy policies and channel encroachment on the power battery recycling of new energy vehicles

Abstract

With the rapid development of new energy vehicles (NEVs), the recycling and reuse of retired power batteries has attracted extensive attention from the society and scholars. In this paper, we establish a closed-loop supply chain model composed of the government, one power battery supplier and one NEV manufacturer. Based on game theory, considering whether the battery supplier encroaches on the power battery recycling channel, we study the optimal decisions of the government and supply chain members under different government subsidy policies (no subsidy, subsidy for the NEV manufacturer and subsidy for consumers) and their impact on profits and social welfare. The results show that, whether the battery supplier encroaches on the recycling channel or not, compared with the no subsidy policy, subsidy for the NEV manufacturer is more conducive to the improvement of enterprise profits and social welfare. In addition, whether the battery collection quantity is constrained by the NEV sales quantity, when the recycling channel cost is lower than a certain threshold, the encroachment is always beneficial to the battery supplier. When the recycling channel cost is within a certain threshold range, the encroachment will achieve a win-win situation; otherwise, win-lose. When the recycling channel cost is higher than a certain threshold, the encroachment behavior has no impact on the NEV manufacturer and the battery supplier. Finally, we investigate the impact of key parameters on the enterprise profits and social welfare through numerical experiments. We also find that the environmental awareness of consumers have significant impacts on social welfare.