Embodied and embedded ecological rationality: A common vertebrate mechanism for action selection underlies cognition and heuristic decision-making in humans

Abstract

The last common ancestor shared by humans and other vertebrates lived over half a billion years ago. In the time since that ancestral line diverged, evolution by natural selection has produced an impressive diversity—from fish to birds to elephants—of vertebrate morphology; yet despite the great species-level differences that otherwise exist across the brains of many animals, the neural circuitry that underlies motor control features a functional architecture that is virtually unchanged in every living species of vertebrate. In this article, we review how that circuitry facilitates motor control, trial-and-error-based procedural learning, and habit formation; we then develop a model that describes how this circuitry (embodied in an agent) works to build and refine sequences of goal-directed actions that are molded to fit the structure of the environment (in which the agent is embedded). We subsequently review evidence suggesting that this same functional circuitry became further adapted to regulate cognitive control in humans as well as motor control; then, using examples of heuristic decision-making from the ecological rationality tradition, we show how the model can be used to understand how that circuitry operates analogously in both cognitive and motor domains. We conclude with a discussion of how the model encourages a shift in perspective regarding ecological rationality’s “adaptive toolbox”—namely, to one that views heuristic processes and other forms of goal-directed cognition as likely being implemented by the same neural circuitry (and in the same fashion) as goal-directed action in the motor domain—and how this change of perspective can be useful.