Lobbying “from within”: A new perspective on the revolving door and regulatory capture

Abstract

This study explores the revolving door phenomenon–when public office holders move back and forth from the public to the private sector, often becoming lobbyists–and its implications on regulatory capture. It draws on the literature on regulatory capture theory and 46 interviews conducted in Quebec with public officers (ministers, chiefs of staff, deputy ministers, and heads of governmental organizations) whose career path includes a revolving door scenario, as well as observers of the phenomenon. New light is shed on capture theory by using a broad definition of the revolving door that focuses on the entry stage. A key finding is that “cultural capture” can occur when new public officers come from the same private sector now within their purview. Based on public officers’ allegiance to their former industry, lobbying is de facto exerted, “from within.” Despite clear irregularities and conflicts of interest, most of those interviewed do not believe in tightening rules and prefer continuing with vigilance from public office holders, journalists, and other observers.