Sustainable Development and Deep Ecology

Abstract

Environmental Ethics and Ecofeminism Ethical inquiry claims to expose moral truths to which any "good" person must adhere. I have always been somewhat suspect of ethics because of the dogmatic nature of the conclusions put forward, and the method of reasoning behind the project. Philosophical arguments rely on linear, "rational" logic that is ostensibly free from emotions that can only cloud the Truth. I may not be fair in my assessment of an entire sub-discipline, but these are the impressions I have from my limited contact with moral disputes. I seriously question the methodology and reasoning that is behind moral arguments, and thus with a wary eye and vague feeling of hypocrisy I write what follows. Four fundamental questions are raised by the readings this week. First, what is the nature of oppressive systems? Are there inherent characteristics that are common to all types of oppression? Second, is there a connection between systems of oppression? Specifically, is the oppression of women and Third World peoples tied to environmental destruction? Third, what are the theoretical assumptions necessary for a framework that doesn't perpetuate environmental destruction and the oppression of people? Fourth, how does one resolve the conflict between the interests of people and the interests of non-humans? Are these interests fundamentally in conflict or do we construe them as conflicting? I will address these questions individually in light of the readings. Karen Warren (1987) is the only author this week who addresses the nature of oppressive systems directly in a conceptual discussion. She identifies a patriarchal conceptual framework that "is characterized by value hierarchical thinking." (p. 6). Such a system of thought creates oppositional dualisms and thus supports a "logic of domination" (p. 6). Dualisms including culture-nature, male-female, and mind-body are construed as conceptual opposites when in fact they are parts of the same whole. Joni Seager (1993) and Susan Christopherson (1989) both touch on the nature of oppression in the context of institutions. Christopherson discusses the patriarchal basis of most theory construction. Theory construction is an institutional process grounded in the academic mainstream. In order to bring a feminist critique to human geography, the categories of analysis and the resulting questions asked need to be deconstructed. Seager applies this type of feminist analysis. She discusses the role of institutions, namely: the state, militaries, multinational corporations, and the large environmental organizations (p 4), in the destruction of the environment. Their perspective is inherently male and thus hierarchical relations between humans and nature is implicit in their approach to environmental problems. Exposing the gendered nature of these institutions reveals new directions for solutions to environmental problems. Attfield (1992) criticizes unidimensional conceptions of oppression including patriarchy and class analysis drawing heavily from the work of Warwick Fox. He claims these two paradigms simultaneously homogenize members of a class or gender resulting in scapegoating, and yet fail to expose the agency of certain sub-sectors of these categories. While Seager and Warren both pull on an analysis of patriarchy to support their ideas of oppression, neither author essentializes women or men. They demonstrate the institutional nature of patriarchy as a system of thought rather than blaming men for environmental problems or attributing the solutions to women. Attfield's point about the need to see oppression as a multi-dimensional process is well taken, but his assessment of patriarchy and class analyses is based on a simplistic understanding of those theories. They are not inherently essentializing theories, it is their application that can fall into that trap. The idea of interconnected systems of oppression is a distinctly feminist conception. The three feminist writers, Seager, Christopherson, and Warren, emphasize the need to understand how patriarchy creates a system of thought that creates false hierarchies such as men-women, First World-Third World, and humans-nature. These conceptual hierarchies allow for the oppression of anything considered below a group or institution within the hierarchy. Thus the oppression of women and nature are inextricably connected; they are part of the same process. Naess and Attfield, on the other hand, do not make a necessary connection between systems of oppressions, and they ignore the question of gender entirely. They are primarily concerned with demonstrating how development for oppressed peoples (implicitly the Third World poor) and the preservation of nature do not have to be conflicting projects. Naess approaches the problem from the perspective of the environment and the need for radical social change. Attfield agrees with many of Naess' tenants, but defends the need for economic development to alleviate environmental problems. Naess claims that the desire of some women to have five or six children need not inherently be inconsistent with dramatic population decrease, or that the need for the preservation of habitat for animals means denying people access to subsistence. These disclaimers are tacked on, apparently to satisfy his critics who have accused Deep Ecology as an affluent, western paradigm. Attfield similarly fails to present a consistent argument, although he attempts to connect development and environmental preservation. He argues for sustainable development, but does not discuss what type of development is sustainable. Economic development is generally synonymous with capitalist development in western literature, yet Attfield does not define what type of development would be beneficial. His arguments for the need for development to solve environmental problems is directed primarily at the Third World. He does not address the substantial environmental problems capitalist economic development has created in the First World. Attfield's argument would be significantly strengthened by discussing both the type of development he advocates and its possible environmental consequences. Both authors, therefore, fail to develop a consistent theoretical framework that has environmental restoration and the interests of the Third World poor as connected and central tenants. If one considers systems of oppressions to be connected the theoretical assumptions considered necessary for a new environmental ethics change profoundly. Naess and Attfield place the need for a non-human centered perspective at the center of a new environmental ethics. Naess, in particular, argues for the rights of non-human organisms to exist and the duty of humans to reduce our influence on the natural world to ensure the survival of these organisms. Naess' argument is problematic on several points, however. If all non-human organisms have the right to exist then vaccines and antibiotics are unjust. Humans are the habitat for a large number of micro organisms that make us sick or can even kill us. According to Naess' logic, we are denying these organisms habitat by taking vaccines. Given Naess' disclaimers about the need to protect already living people, I doubt he would advocate eliminating vaccinations and antibiotics. An environmental ethics organized around the principle that non-human life has a right to exist and humans have no right to reduce the diversity of such organisms except to satisfy basic human needs is more problematic than helpful. The roots of the oppression of both nature and Others is not addressed and the argument has undesirable conclusions. The work of Warren and Seager, however, does address the roots of oppression. Warren does not attempt to formulate a theory of ecofeminism, but rather outlines some broad assumptions that underlie most ecofeminisms. The need to connect systems of oppression is central to ecofeminist theories, as is the need to apply a feminist perspective to ecological problems. Seager agrees with these two assumptions and adds the need for institutional analysis to understand both oppression and environmental destruction. These feminist analyses present the most convincing critique to me. By connecting systems of oppression and examining their institutional nature, both the causes and possible cures for environmental and social problems emerge. The tools for developing a new, non-hierarchical perspective are inherent in this analysis. The Deep Ecologists fail to provide a conceptual bridge from our current ways of thinking to their nature-centered perspective. It is not enough to say that we have to think differently if the institutions and assumptions that gave rise to those systems of thought are not challenged. A feminist analysis also resolves the question of how to reconcile the interests of humans and non-humans. In an ecofeminist conception, the needs of humans and non-humans are not in conflict. The institutional basis of environmental destruction and oppression of people suggests that changing these institutions can give rise to systems of thought that will fundamentally oppose both the destruction of nature and the oppression of Others. What form these new institutions will take is still to be resolved. Ecofeminists continue to disagree on the nature of the connections between systems of oppression and whether or not these connections are liberating or disempowering. These conflicts need to be resolved before new institutions can emerge. Deep Ecologists and other environmentalists who fail to engage in an analysis of the fundamental power relations will create new systems of thought that are not fundamentally different than what we already have. They can not resolve the question of how to reconcile human and non-human interests because their ideas are still grounded in opposing dualisms. They attempt to turn over t