We present practical and realistic attacks on some standardized elliptic curve key establishment and public-key encryption protocols that are effective if the receiver of an elliptic curve point does not check that the point lies on the appropriate elliptic curve. The attacks combine ideas from the small subgroup attack of Lim and Lee, and the differential fault attack of Biehl, Meyer and Müller. Although the ideas behind the attacks are quite elementary, and there are simple countermeasures known, the attacks can have drastic consequences if these countermeasures are not taken by implementors of the protocols. We illustrate the effectiveness of such attacks on a key agreement protocol recently proposed for the IEEE 802.15 Wireless Personal Area Network (WPAN) standard. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003.
CITATION STYLE
Antipa, A., Brown, D., Menezes, A., Struik, R., & Vanstone, S. (2003). Validation of elliptic curve public keys. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 2567, 211–223. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36288-6_16
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.