When do bureaucrats respond to external demands? A theoretical framework and empirical test of bureaucratic responsiveness

Abstract

Bureaucrats must balance neutral competence with responsiveness to external demands. As external demands are simultaneous and multidimensional, this study analyzes bureaucratic responsiveness according to bureaucratic actors' prioritization decisions. Using a discrete choice experiment followed by qualitative interviews in the context of EU agencies, we investigate to what extent bureaucratic responsiveness depends upon the stakeholder that expresses an external demand (source), the aspect of bureaucratic conduct that is addressed (content), and the presence of adverse media attention (salience). In addition to corroborating prior empirical findings, we provide a novel understanding of bureaucratic responsiveness by showing the way demands' source and content affect responsiveness jointly. Across the range of technical, performative, legal-procedural, and moral demands, we identify which stakeholders can impose demands most authoritatively. We also extend previous research by demonstrating that adverse media attention strengthens responsiveness to technical and moral demands, but not to performative and legal-procedural demands.