Recently, cryptographic access control has received a lot of attention, mainly due to the availability of efficient Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) schemes. ABE allows to get rid of a trusted reference monitor by enforcing access rules in a cryptographic way. However, ABE has a privacy problem: The access policies are sent in clear along with the ciphertexts. Further generalizing the idea of policy-hiding in cryptographic access control, we introduce policy anonymity where - similar to the well-understood concept of k-anonymity - the attacker can only see a large set of possible policies that might have been used to encrypt, but is not able to identify the one that was actually used. We show that using a concept from graph theory we can extend a known ABE construction to achieve the desired privacy property. © 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
CITATION STYLE
Müller, S., & Katzenbeisser, S. (2012). Hiding the policy in cryptographic access control. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 7170 LNCS, pp. 90–105). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29963-6_8
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