A range of common software components are gradually being integrated into the infrastructures that support safety-critical systems. These include network management tools, operating systems - especially Linux, Voice Over IP (VOIP) communications technologies, and satellite based augmentation systems for navigation/timing data etc. The increasing use of these common components creates concerns that bugs might affect multiple systems across many different safety-related industries. It also raises significant security concerns. Malware has been detected in power distribution, healthcare, military and transportation infrastructures. Most previous attacks do not seem to have deliberately targeted critical applications. However, there is no room for complacency in the face of increasing vulnerability to cyber attacks on safety-related systems. This paper illustrates the threat to air traffic management infrastructures and goes on to present a roadmap to increase our resilience to future CyberSafety attacks. Some components of this proposal are familiar concepts from Security Management Systems (SecMS), including a focus on incident reporting and the need for improved risk assessment tools. Other components of the roadmap focus on structural and organizational problems that have limited the effectiveness of existing SecMS; in particular there is a need to raise awareness amongst regulators and senior management who often lack the technical and engineering background to understand the nature of the threats to safety-critical software. © Springer-Verlag London Limited 2012.
CITATION STYLE
Johnson, C. (2012). CyberSafety: CyberSecurity and safety-critical software engineering. In Achieving Systems Safety - Proceedings of the 20th Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, SSS 2012 (pp. 85–95). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-2494-8_8
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