Dynamic Bayesian Games for Adversarial and Defensive Cyber Deception

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Abstract

Security challenges accompany the efficiency. The pervasive integration of information and communications technologies (ICTs) makes cyber-physical systems vulnerable to targeted attacks that are deceptive, persistent, adaptive, and strategic. Attack instances such as Stuxnet, Dyn, and WannaCry ransomware have shown the insufficiency of off-the-shelf defensive methods including the firewall and intrusion detection systems. Hence, it is essential to design up-to-date security mechanisms that can mitigate the risks despite the successful infiltration and the strategic response of sophisticated attackers

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Huang, L., & Zhu, Q. (2019). Dynamic Bayesian Games for Adversarial and Defensive Cyber Deception. In Autonomous Cyber Deception: Reasoning, Adaptive Planning, and Evaluation of HoneyThings (pp. 75–97). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02110-8_5

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