Self-interested behaviors of managers about selective environmental information disclosure and influencing factors researching

Abstract

For the past few years, all sectors of the society are keeping eyes on environmental governance and disclosure, and also a lot of controversy paid more attention to self-interested behaviors of managers in environmental information disclosure field at home and aboard. In addition, the paper discusses the self-interested behaviors of managers and characters embedding on environmental information disclosure places, contents and standards and analyses the related factors affecting self-interested level of managers. The study finds: (1) No matter what the disclosure places, contents and standards are, there are obvious self-interested behaviors of managers in many aspects and the non state-owned listed firms are more significant than the state-owned listed firms. (2) From the angle of corporate governance, both CEO duality and managers’ shareholdings in non owned-stated listed firms and institutional investors’ shareholdings in owned-stated listed firms will constrict managers’ self-interested behaviors. (3) In other related influence factors, firms scale, financial level and cash flow affect self-interested behavior of managers in selective environmental information disclosure.