Abstract
Article Outline: Glossary Definition of the Subject Strategies, Payoffs, Value and Equilibria The Standard Model of Aumann and Maschler Vector Payoffs and Approachability Zero-Sum Games with Lack of Information on Both Sides Non Zero-Sum Games with Lack of Information on One Side Non-observable Actions Miscellaneous Future Directions Acknowledgments Bibliography
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CITATION STYLE
APA
Renault, J. (2012). Repeated games with incomplete information. In Computational Complexity: Theory, Techniques, and Applications (Vol. 9781461418009, pp. 2635–2655). Springer New York. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1800-9_162
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