Terrorism depends on surprise. With it, a terrorist attack has the potential to do massive damage to an unwitting and unprepared target. Without it, the terrorists stand a good chance of being thwarted by authorities, and even if they are not, the damage from their attacks is likely to be less severe. It follows that the United States must take every appropriate action to avoid being surprised by another terrorist attack. To secure the homeland, we must have an intelligence and warning system that is capable of detecting terrorist activity before it manifests itself in an attack so that proper preemptive, preventive, and protective action can be taken. This is not the first time in American history that we have had to focus on our early warning capabilities. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, demonstrated the catastrophic consequences of allowing an enemy to achieve even tactical surprise. With the dawn of the nuclear age, early warning became essential to national survival. The United States spent billions of dollars during the Cold War on ground-and space-based sensors that had one principal, overriding purpose: to detect indications of a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. These early warning systems were the foundation for strategic nuclear deterrence because they provided the President sufficient lead-time to make retaliatory decisions. Early warning of an impending terrorist attack is a far more difficult and complex mission than was early warning of a strategic nuclear first strike. Whereas we almost always know the identity, location, and general capabilities of hostile nations, we frequently do not know the identity or location of non-state terrorist organizations. The indications of terrorist intent are often ambiguous. Terrorists are able to infiltrate and move freely within democratic countries making themselves effectively invisible against the backdrop of an enormously diverse and mobile society. Efforts to gather intelligence on potential terrorist threats can T H E
CITATION STYLE
Intelligence and Warning. (2006). In Intelligence and Security Informatics for International Security (pp. 55–73). Kluwer Academic Publishers. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-30332-4_5
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