Self-deception and religious beliefs

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Abstract

Criticism against religions and religious beliefs has taken many forms [1]. Some of the criticism is in a broad sense pragmatic, while other objections are epistemic or metaphysical. Famous critics such as Richard Dawkins and D.C. Dennett have presented a whole range of arguments against religious convictions. A special form of criticism is the idea that religious beliefs or “avowals” are actually results of self-deception [2]. Since self-deception is a form of irrationality, having religious beliefs is irrational, at least in the epistemic sense. This claim has been defended, among others, by Georges Rey and Adèle Mercier.

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Räikkä, J. (2014). Self-deception and religious beliefs. In Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics (Vol. 14, pp. 155–167). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04633-4_12

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