As safety-critical systems increasingly rely on computing, communication, and control, there have been a number of safety and security co-analysis methods put forth to identify, assess, and mitigate risks. However, there is an ideological gap between qualitative system-level methods that focus on control interactions, and more traditional methods based on component failure and/or vulnerability. The growing complexity of cyber-physical and socio-technical systems as well as their interactions with their environments seem to demand a systems-theoretic perspective. Yet, at the same time, more complex threats and failure modes imply a greater need for risk-based analysis to understand and prioritize the large volume of information. In this work we identify promising aspects from two existing safety/security co-analysis methods and outline a vision for reconciling them in a new analysis method.
CITATION STYLE
Temple, W. G., Wu, Y., Chen, B., & Kalbarczyk, Z. (2017). Reconciling systems-theoretic and component-centric methods for safety and security co-analysis. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 10489 LNCS, pp. 87–93). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66284-8_9
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