The feasibility of a diplomatic solution to the confrontation over Iran's nuclear program

Abstract

Iran and the United Nations Security Council have been in an escalating confrontation over Iran's enrichment program since 2006. The Security Council has been demanding that Iran suspend its enrichment while Iran has been demanding that the Security Council recognize Iran's right to enrich. As a result of the impasse, the Security Council and the West have been increasing sanctions on Iran while Iran has been expanding its enrichment program and increasing the enrichment of its product. It is proposed that, as a compromise, the UN Security Council accept an Iranian enrichment program in exchange for maximal transparency (Additional Protocol plus) and constraints including limits on: enrichment capacity, enrichment level to less than 5 %, and stockpiles of enriched UF6. In addition, Iran would agree not to reprocess spent fuel, i.e. separate plutonium, and to export all of its spent fuel. It is pointed out that, in 2005, Iran offered to accept essentially all of these transparency requirements and constraints.