Theoretical Perspectives of Safety and Security in Transit Environments

Abstract

Arguably the criminological perspective most analogous to public trans-portation systems is crime pattern theory (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993). This theory consists of three key concepts, nodes, paths and edges. A node is an activity space in which people carry out major activities and spend most of their time, for example, school, work and leisure. It is suggested that around these activity nodes users will develop awareness spaces, the settings with which they become familiar. On transportation systems the nodes can be considered as the stops, stations and interchanges of the system. The pathways that people take between these nodes, often with a fair degree of regularity, are what crime pattern theory terms paths. In the context of transport journeys these are the routes travelled by passen-gers during a journey, the en-route aspects of the transit settings aboard a particular mode of transport, for example, a bus, train or tram. The final concept of crime pattern theory is that of edges, beyond which persons are unfamiliar with. On the public transit system the edges can be perceived as the boundaries of the transport environment, in which the transport system ends and a different environment begins. However, in the context of the whole journey approach, these edges may become fuzzy, especially during the walking aspect of any trip. Around these nodes, paths and edges is an awareness space, a term which applies to both offenders and non-offenders. In terms of explaining crime at nodes, crime pattern theory postulates that offenders will operate within or close to their awareness space. As transport nodes may represent a key component of a person's activity space, it follows that transport nodes may also embody settings with a likely convergence of activities, in which potential offenders and targets may meet. A question this raises for public transport is whether the offender's activity spaces focus solely on transport nodes and the nearby surroundings, or whether this extends to transport routes. Outside of the transit environment the paths taken between nodes by potential victims are, on the whole, unrestricted, except perhaps by natural barriers such as rivers, and paths are likely to be walking or driving routes. On a transport system the paths a victim can select are effectively restricted to the layout of the transport network and a number of finite fixed routes. An offender's activity space may therefore extend from activity nodes outwards onto paths, in other words, from stops and stations onto buses and trains. Therefore the transit system may itself represent an expan-sion of awareness space, thus extending possible areas for offending. Micro transit environments and the transit node Before the establishment of modern public transportation systems in 1800, Colquhoun showed how transportation nodes concentrated a large number of crimes triggered by the movement and assemblage of valuable goods in Theoretical Perspectives of Safety and Security 25 the Port of London. Nowadays, transit environments are no different. They represent the convergence points of the transportation network, and are often highlighted as criminogenic places in the literature. Together with the related consumer services they provide, they create areas of exceptionally high, short-term population turnover, which may create conditions that are particularly rewarding for offenders, as travellers move through areas with which they are not familiar, and thus may be particularly vulnerable to the activities of opportunistic motivated offenders. What makes transit nodes criminogenic, and what are the likely explanations for this? However, as with most place-based research, not all stations are high risk and some expe-rience low levels of crime, and hence a fundamental question is why some transit are nodes more susceptible to crime and disorder than others. Routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979) is closely tied with crime pattern theory and suggests that the occurrence of a crime requires the conver-gence of three factors in time and space: a motivated offender, a suitable target and the absence of a capable guardian. Within a rapidly moving transport system, there is a constant interchange of potential offenders, possible targets (infrastructure, passengers or staff) and potential guardians. These guardians can include ticket inspectors, police or other security, closed-circuit televi-sion (CCTV), general peripatetic staff or even passengers. However, due to the dynamic nature of the transit system and the high volume of passengers moving through confined spaces in a relatively short space of time, there may be several favourable opportunities for an offender to come into contact with a potential victim. There is also perhaps a reduced time frame for a suitable guardian to be present compared with situations outside a transport system, due to the volume and flux of passengers across the network. Passengers may be tired, less on their guard or unfamiliar with the possible risk of crime on a transport system, and hence a number of potential targets may be present at transport nodes. Therefore, crime pattern theory and routine activities theory together provide some potential insight as to why public transportation nodes may be criminogenic, as they are activity spaces that bring together a conver-gence of potential offenders, suitable targets and lack of capable guardians, and thus suitable opportunities for crime. A key feature of many transit nodes, be they stops or stations, is that they have been designed, or redesigned, to incorporate a number of the principles of designing out crime (La Vigne 1997, Cozens 2004, Liggett et al., 2004). Many rail stations in the United Kingdom, for example, aim to conform to the Secure Stations Scheme, based on Secured by Design award princi-ples, and managed by the Department for Transport (DfT) and the British Transport Police (BTP). Similar efforts have also been made in designing the security of bus stations (DfT, 2002). Examples of design features which have been introduced include sight lines and transparency with no obsta-cles, natural boundaries and illumination, and the removal of dark, hidden places and large obstacles that obstruct sight lines and transparency.