Abstract
The separation design and fabrication process in the semiconductor industry leads to potential threats such as trojan side-channels (TSCs). In this paper we design a new family of TSCs from physical unclonable functions (PUFs). In particular, a dedicated attack on the PRESENT block cipher is described by using our PUF-based TSCs. Finally we analyze the performance of our PUF-based TSCs and discuss other potential applications. © 2011 IFIP International Federation for Information Processing.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Gong, Z., & Makkes, M. X. (2011). Hardware trojan side-channels based on physical unclonable functions. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 6633 LNCS, pp. 294–303). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21040-2_21
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