Democratizing corruption: a role structure analysis of Indonesia’s “Big Bang” decentralization

Abstract

The study investigates to what degree Indonesia’s large-scale decentralization and democratization changed corruption networks. A role structure approach is developed to move current analysis of dyad-level structures to the network level. This approach is empirically tested by comparing the relational content and third-party structures of 96 corruption networks operating in the first phase of decentralization (2001–2004), characterized by a powerful local council, with 94 corruption networks detected in the second phase (2005–2013), when direct local elections were introduced, and the power of the local council declined. Building on Fiske’s relational model theory, it is argued and found that the local executive’s reduced dependence on the local council provided the opportunity to initiate corrupt exchanges with a broader set of players both inside and outside the bureaucracy. Whereas deep dependence power relations (i.e. formal authority) remained important, an increasing proportion of corruption networks involved compound role structures characterized by both shallow (non-embedded profit and work relations) and deep interdependence (kin- and friendship). Furthermore, third party intermediaries became more important. Implications for the study of networks of corruption are discussed.