The Moral-Legal Janus Face of Human Rights

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Abstract

The complexity of our contemporary world requires a new approach to human rights. Human rights should no longer be conceived as a mere protection of human liberties and dignity. They must include the promotion and enhancement of conditions of life that give every person opportunities to pursue and achieve his or her happiness. Such a goal can be achieved only if there are institutions that can provide a stable basis for social integration. To approach human rights merely as legal rights or moral rights fails to capture their full meaning and scope, and weakens the effectiveness of their implementation. Human rights remain simple ideals without any concrete materialization in real life. The legal aspect of human rights materializes and protects their moral aspect. Differently put, the moral aspect of human rights consists of general norms and rights that constitute the standard on which life in society should be built, while the legal aspect constitutes the concretization of moral norms and rights. Thus, the legal aspect of human rights has the moral aspect of human rights as its core, for there can never be a productive and effective legitimation or institutionalization of human rights when their moral foundation is violated.

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APA

Moka-Mubelo, W. (2017). The Moral-Legal Janus Face of Human Rights. In Philosophy and Politics - Critical Explorations (Vol. 3, pp. 127–146). Springer Science and Business Media B.V. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49496-8_5

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