Vagueness, Ambiguity, and the “Sound” of Meaning

Abstract

Ambiguity and vagueness are clearly very distinct properties, but the nature of the distinction deserves some careful analysis. This chapter considers three obvious possibilities: (a) that ambiguity and vagueness are simply distinct properties as are for instance being blue and being square; (b) that they are not only distinct properties, but are furthermore mutually incompatible properties, as are for instance being square and being round; (c) that they are still more profoundly distinct properties in that they pertain to ontologically distinct categories of arguments, as are for instance being prime and being dead. The full answer turns out to be more complicated than any single one of these three possibilities. But to see this we must take seriously the fact that words can be spoken and heard (and understood) in accord with phonological rules. I will describe some conceptual issues about language that this fact raises but that have unfortunately been overlooked by philosophers.