Russia as a great power, 1815-2007

Abstract

Russia's quest for the status of great power within the confines of the state system has been an ongoing concern since the time of Peter. After the Napoleonic Wars, Russia thought it had acquired great power status, only to discover that, after the Crimean War, it had either never been firmly obtained or it had been lost. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the issue has once again dominated the foreign policy debate. Part 1 presents the two traditional ways of defining great power (Weberian vs Durkhiemian), and suggests that, in order to account fully for the lack of recognition by established great powers, we need to add a third, concerning governance. The inspiration for this move I take from Foucault's work on the emergence of governmentality. Russia's lack of social power to have its regime type accepted as being on a par with European ones is the key problem hampering Russia's quest for recognition. Drawing on extant historical studies, part 2 presents empirical evidence that this factor was present and remains so in European representations of Russia. I conclude that, as long as Russia's rationality of government deviates from present-day hegemonic neo-liberal models by favouring direct state rule rather than indirect governance, the West will not recognize Russia as a fully fledged great power.