We study the problem of designing group-strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms. The players report their bids for getting serviced and the mechanism decides a set of players that are going to be serviced and how much each one of them is going to pay. We determine three conditions: Fence Monotonicity, Stability of the allocation and Validity of the tie-breaking rule that are necessary and sufficient for group-strategyproofness, regardless of the cost function. Consequently, Fence Monotonicity characterizes group-strategyproof cost-sharing schemes closing an important open problem. Finally, we use our results to prove that there exist families of cost functions, where any group-strategyproof mechanism has arbitrarily poor budget balance. © 2010 Springer-Verlag.
CITATION STYLE
Pountourakis, E., & Vidali, A. (2010). A complete characterization of group-strategyproof mechanisms of cost-sharing. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 6346 LNCS, pp. 146–157). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15775-2_13
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