Information-flow security type systems ensure confidentiality by enforcing noninterference: a program cannot leak private data to public channels. However, in practice, programs need to selectively declassify information about private data. Several approaches have provided a notion of relaxed noninterference supporting selective and expressive declassification while retaining a formal security property. The labels-as-functions approach provides relaxed noninterference by means of declassification policies expressed as functions. The labels-as-types approach expresses declassification policies using type abstraction and faceted types, a pair of types representing the secret and public facets of values. The original proposal of labels-as-types is formulated in an object-oriented setting where type abstraction is realized by subtyping. The object-oriented approach however suffers from limitations due to its receiver-centric paradigm. In this work, we consider an alternative approach to labels-as-types, applicable in non-object-oriented languages, which allows us to express advanced declassification policies, such as extrinsic policies, based on a different form of type abstraction: existential types. An existential type exposes abstract types and operations on these; we leverage this abstraction mechanism to express secrets that can be declassified using the provided operations. We formalize the approach in a core functional calculus with existential types, define existential relaxed noninterference, and prove that well-typed programs satisfy this form of type-based relaxed noninterference.
CITATION STYLE
Cruz, R., & Tanter, É. (2019). Existential types for relaxed noninterference. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 11893 LNCS, pp. 73–92). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34175-6_5
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