We study the Combinatorial Public Project Problem (CPPP) in which n agents are assigned a subset of m resources of size k so as to maximize the social welfare. Combinatorial public projects are an abstraction of many resource-assignment problems (Internet-related network design, elections, etc.). It is known that if all agents have submodular valuations then a constant approximation is achievable in polynomial time. However, submodularity is a strong assumption that does not always hold in practice. We show that (unlike similar problems such as combinatorial auctions) even slight relaxations of the submodularity assumption result in non-constant lower bounds for approximation. © 2008 Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
CITATION STYLE
Schapira, M., & Singer, Y. (2008). Inapproximability of combinatorial public projects. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 5385 LNCS, pp. 351–361). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_41
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.